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ABSTRACT
Recent advances in positioning and tracking technologies have led
to the emergence of novel location-based applications that allow
participants to access information relevant to their spatio-temporal
context. Traditional access control models, such as role-based ac-
cess control (RBAC), are not sufficient to address the new chal-
lenges introduced by these location-based applications. Several re-
cent research efforts have enhanced RBAC with spatio-temporal
features. Nevertheless, the state-of-the-art does not deal with mo-
bility of both subjects and objects and does not support the utiliza-
tion of complex access control decisions based on spatio-temporal
relationships among subjects and objects. Furthermore, such re-
lationships change frequently in dynamic environments, requiring
efficient mechanisms to monitor and re-evaluate access control de-
cisions. In this position paper, we present a healthcare emergency
response scenario which highlights the novel challenges that arise
when enforcing access control in an environment with moving sub-
jects and objects. To address a realistic application scenario, we
consider movement on road networks, and we identify complex ac-
cess control decisions relevant to such settings. We overview the
main technical issues to be addressed, and we describe the archi-
tecture for policy decision and enforcement points.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.2.0 [General]: Security, integrity, and protection; H.2.8 [Database
Applications]: Spatial databases and GIS; J.3 [Life and Medical
Sciences]: Medical Information Systems
1. INTRODUCTION
The availability of mobile devices with positioning capabilities
has fostered the development of location-based applications that
allow users to access information relevant to their spatio-temporal
context. For instance, visitors of a museum may be able to access a
electronic on-line guide system as long as they are situated within
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the museum’s perimeter. Such applications introduce specific secu-
rity challenges that reach beyond the capabilities of traditional ac-
cess control systems, such as Role Based Access Control (RBAC).
Several models have been proposed [1, 2, 5] that extend RBAC
to allow the specification of policies in which the access decision is
determined by the spatio-temporal context of subjects and objects.
However, these models relate the role extents to fixed locations, re-
stricting the policies to static zones. Therefore, they may not be
suitable for dynamic mobile environments where both subjects and
objects are moving continuously. In addition, in certain location-
based application scenarios, the access control decision may de-
pend on complex spatio-temporal relationships among subjects and
objects. Surveys of access control in location-based services can be
found in the literature [3].
In this position paper, we outline an access control framework
for healthcare emergency response that illustrates the requirements
to access control in a dynamic environment with mobile subjects
and objects. In this scenario, a patient who requires an emergency
response triggers an event that results in the creation of an emer-
gency care request in the system. Such an event can be generated
by the patients themselves, or by an automatic system designed to
alert emergency response teams (e.g., in-vehicle GPS-enabled units
such as On-Star provide automatic car crash notification).
The record inserted in the system contains a number of event
attributes, for instance, symptoms, vital signs, as well as the age
and gender of the patient. Based on the patient identifiers (e.g., cell
phone number, or identifier of the reporting On-Star unit) additional
information can be associated with the emergency record request,
such as the patient’s medical history.
The location of the emergency, the patient symptoms, medical
history, etc., represent objects that need to be accessed by several
categories of mobile subjects, such as medical doctors, ambulance
personnel or medical-trained volunteers. Note that the objects may
also be mobile. For instance, a patient suffering from a heart attack
may be in a moving vehicle drove by a family member.
An event may refer to a single patient, e.g., an individual with
a heart attack, or it may involve several patients, e.g., in the case
of a car accident. In response to an event, the emergency response
system must find subjects that are authorized to access the event’s
attributes and provide on-site help to patients. We identify two key
requirements.
First, as medical information is sensitive, the system needs to en-
sure that access to confidential data is thoroughly controlled. Note
that distinct subjects may have different privileges with respect to
information disclosure: For example, doctors may be allowed to
access medical history, whereas volunteers should not learn con-
fidential information about the patient that it is not related to the
current event.
Second, an emergency requires fast response. The authorized
subjects should be able to arrive at the location of the emergency
within a maximum period of time. Thus, the decision about which
subjects to authorize must take into account the distance between
the event location and the subjects.
Two representative types of location constraints are range and
nearest-neighbor constraints. For instance, the former corresponds
to requirements such as, “A subject is only allowed to access an
event record if its distance to the event site is less than one mile,”
whereas the latter addresses requirements such as, “A subject is
only allowed to access an event record if it is the nearest subject to
the event site.”
In addition, the positions of both subjects and objects may change
over time. Therefore, the spatial relationship between subjects and
objects must be monitored continuously. Note that spatial and non-
spatial (e.g., level of medical education, specialization, required
equipment) constraints may be combined. For instance, if a volun-
teer and a doctor are located at the same distance, only the doctor
should be granted access. Such complex access control decisions
require specialized mechanisms for the design of policy enforce-
ment and decision points (PEP/PDP).
Figure 1: Emergency Response Scenario
The example in Figure 1(a) shows several volunteers vi and off-
duty doctors di driving around a city, in additio to a hospital. Con-
sider that a car accident is reported at location A, and the car crash
victim has a pre-existing heart condition and suffers from diabetes.
In response to the event, the emergency response system takes the
following actions: First, an ambulance is requested from the near-
est hospital. Next, doctor d1 who is nearest to the accident site is
notified, and starts moving towards the site to perform a prelimi-
nary evaluation and treatment before the ambulance arrives. The
notification sent to d1 includes the coordinates of the accident site
together with some basic information about the nature of the emer-
gency, the victim’s age, and pre-existing conditions.
As d1 moves towards the accident site, a traffic jam may occur
at intersection B, so d1 is no longer able to reach the patient in
time (Figure 1(b)). The system considers additional subjects, such
as volunteers v1 and v2. Although v2 is closer to the accident site
than v1, the route of v2 crosses the traffic jam, so v1 is chosen
instead. In addition, doctor d2 is selected, and both are granted ac-
cess to the event record. However, doctor d2 is granted permission
to access more data about the victim, such as medical history. Such
information is not made available to v1.
While the volunteer v1 and the doctor d2 stabilize the patient,
the hospital may not find an available ambulance. Then, the system
may authorize d2 to drive the patient to the hospital, if the patient
is in a stable condition. Otherwise, an additional doctor (e.g., d3)
may be authorized to assist in the emergency. The system may de-
cide on the amount of data to be disclosed to a subject based on
the proximity to the accident site. This prevents the disclosure of
sensitive information to subjects that are not likely to participate
in the emergency, such as subjects that are delayed due to environ-
mental conditions (as d1 in the example above). However, some
general details can be provided to such entities, in order to provide
a backup plan.
This approach applies to location information as well: for in-
stance, only coarse-grained location information may be disclosed
to remote subjects, whereas accurate location data is sent only to
nearby subjects.
The objective of this position paper is to identify the representa-
tive requirements and challenges of location-based access control
in a dynamic environment with mobile subjects and objects. We
investigate access control decisions and enforcement with respect
to a combination of spatial and non-spatial (e.g., role-based) con-
straints.
Although our focus is on healthcare emergency response, many
of the aspects discussed are relevant to other classes of location-
based applications as well (e.g., public transportation). We em-
phasize that our work discusses initial directions and identifies key
challenges in location-based access control; the realization of a
complete access-control mechanism is beyond the scope of this pa-
per. However, we do give an overview of the architectural compo-
nents involved, as well as the main functionality offered by each
component.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the event and policy models. Section 3 illustrates the proposed ar-
chitecture of the system and the tasks performed in each compo-
nent. Section 4 outlines future research directions.
2. EVENT AND POLICY MODELS
As mentioned in Section 1, our envisioned access-control system
is event-centric, meaning that objects are generated following the
occurrence of an event such as a medical emergency (e.g., car acci-
dent). After object creation, the system must decide which subjects
(e.g., medical doctors, volunteers) are granted permission to access
the event-related data based on a mix of spatial and role-based con-
straints.
2.1 Event Model
An event is specified as a tuple:
E = 〈location, category, maxResponseT ime, attributes〉
where
• location indicates the position of the event
• category describes the event type (different types require
different numbers and types of entities)
• maxResponseT ime indicates the maximum allowed time
within which the event must be handled (e.g., the maximum
allowed time for the responders to arrive)
• attributes is a list of event characteristics
Depending on the required functionality of the system, location
may be specified either in physical terms (e.g., as GPS coordinates)
or logical terms (e.g., at the corner of Main Street and Elm Drive).
The use of category determines the number of responders and their
roles. For example, the organization may stipulate that category =
carCrash requires two doctors and one volunteer.
Indicating a maxResponseT ime authorizes the system to re-
lax the data confidentiality and other constraints if the request can-
not be fulfilled. This mechanism allows flexibility for events that
require immediate focus and response, such as severe automobile
crashes. However, we also assume that most events will provide
this piece of data to ensure that help is provided within a reason-
able timeframe.
The attributes are provided when an event is triggered (e.g., the
cell phone number where the 911 call originated). Based on such
attributes, additional data objects can be originated, such as the age
and gender of the person who owns the cell phone (such data is
relevant if the victim places the call).
2.2 Policy Model
The system must support both traditional (e.g., role-based) and
spatio-temporal policies. Traditional policies can integrate other
access control or RBAC rules, such as “A volunteer is not allowed
to access a patient’s previous medical records.”
Spatio-temporal policies indicate constraints and obligations that
cannot be expressed in traditional policies. Examples of spatio-
temporal policies include “A volunteer is not allowed to access a
patient’s information for more than 10 minutes” or “A volunteer
is not allowed to access a patient’s symptoms if there is a doctor
nearby.” Note that the latter policy must be dynamically instanti-
ated to refer to specific elements in an event. That is, the rule should
only apply to a volunteer and a doctor that are part of the same
emergency call, thus belonging to the same event context. Rules
that are not related to a specific event are described as global. The
attribute scope will distinguish between event and global policies.
An access authorization policy is expressed as a tuple:
P = 〈scope, subject, object, feature, granularity, ST 〉
where
• scope is the context in which the rule applies (global or
event).
• subject denotes the entity (e.g. volunteer) to which the
authorization is applied
• object corresponds to the protected entity (e.g., patient whose
medical record is accessed)
• feature denotes the protected information (e.g., medical his-
tory, location, symptoms, diagnosis)
• granularity captures the granularity of the spatio-temporal
feature, or it can be null (e.g., in the case of location infor-
mation, we could specify an accuracy level of neighborhood
or street)
• ST = {ST1, ..., STk} represents the list of spatio-temporal
constraints that control the policy
A spatio-temporal constraint represents a feature that has a spa-
tial and/or a temporal dimension. Each spatio-temporal constraint
STi can be mapped to the following schema:
STi = {type, attribute, S, object, sign, time}
The elements of the schema are defined as follows:
• Element type is the type of the constraint. We consider range
constraint RC, k-nearest neighbor constraint kNN , reverse
k-nearest neighbor constraint RkNN , or null if there is no
spatial dimension.
• Element attribute denotes an additional parameter of the
constraint. For a range constraint, this represents travel time,
and k for (reverse) k-nearest neighbor constraints.
• Element S represents the list of subjects that participate in
the constraint.
• Element object corresponds to the subject, object, or loca-
tion under consideration relative to S.
• Element sign indicates if the constraint is positive or negative.
• Element time specifies the time validity (expiration), which
varies within the interval (0,∞).
As an example of a policy, consider the rule, “A volunteer is not
allowed to access a patient’s symptoms if there is a doctor in less
than 10 meters.”. This policy would be expressed as the tuple
P = 〈“event”, “volunteer”, “patient”, “symptoms”, φ, S1〉
The spatio-temporal constraint would be expressed as
S1 = 〈“RC”, “10m”, “volunteer”, “doctor”, “negative”,∞〉
Although the subjects in both the policy and the constraint are the
same in this example, this will not always be the case. That is, to
prevent redundant constraint expressions, S1 could also be used in
a policy tuple describing the doctor’s permissions given that con-
straint.
3. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
3.1 Overview
In traditional access control systems, a user initiates a request
and submits his or her relevant credentials, such as a username and
password. The system then evaluates the combination of the sub-
ject, the object requested, the credentials provided, and the relevant
policies, and it grants or denies access accordingly. In our pro-
posed approach, a request is automatically generated in response to
an event. The system then grants permissions to subjects, given the
current spatio-temporal environment and policy constraints.
Our approach encompasses a number of key novelties. First, the
system can grant permissions to multiple subjects simultaneously
as part of a single request. Second, the subjects receiving access
are not known when the request is initiated. That is, the system
must determine the most appropriate subjects in response to a re-
quest. Finally, the dynamic nature of spatio-temporal environments
necessitates continuous monitoring of subjects and objects. For ex-
ample, if the traffic congestion increases in one location, the system
may need to revoke or reassign authorizations in response to this.
Despite these differences, we find that the traditional notions of
Policy Decision Point (PDP) and Policy Enforcement Point (PEP)
are still applicable.
In addition to the PDP and PEP components, we also introduce a
Policy Database (PolicyDB) and a Moving Object Database (MOD).
PolicyDB contains the access control policies as specified by Sec-
tion 2.2. On the other hand, the positions of objects and subjects
are indexed by the Moving Object Database, where the weights of
the edges represent the driving time of each road segment (which
forms a travel time network [4]). In our setting, where a timely
response to an emergency is essential, the use of travel time is a
better choice than the use of network distance, as the former metric
captures and estimates the time that is required for an to travel to
a certain location in the network. Moreover, we assume that the
database is updated with real-time traffic information.
Figure 2 illustrates the interaction among the PEP/PDP and the
rest of the system components when a new event is created (steps 1
and 2). As stated above, the PDP decides which entities will be
granted access to the event information (step 3). In order to do
this, the PDP queries the MOD to find subjects who have the re-
quired skills and are nearby the event location (the number and
skills of the subjects that are required in each case are determined
by the type of the event). Note that the MOD may need to provide
more subjects than are required by the event type, in case one or
more of the subjects is unable or unwilling to respond to the event.
Then, the access policies involving those subjects are obtained by
querying PolicyDB (step 4). As described in Section 2, these poli-
cies can contain static (organizational) and spatio-temporal rules
that need to be continuously monitored by the PEP. Therefore, the
PEP receives the subjects that will be involved in the event and the
constraints (step 5). Finally, the monitoring of the constraints is
initiated (step 6), and the subjects are notified (steps 7 and 8).
Figure 2: System Architecture
The Application layer abstracts the communication with the users,
the sending of notifications, and the handling of location updates.
In a variant of the scenario, the position of the users may be given
by a external location provider.
3.2 Access Control Decision
The PDP needs to perform two main decision tasks. When an ac-
cess request arrives in the system, it decides whether or not to grant
the access based on the policies that refer to the subject. The second
task, as mentioned previously, finds nearby and suitable subjects
that may respond to a new event. The first operation corresponds
to the functionality of a traditional access control system and is not
considered in this paper.
For the latter, the PDP performs an incremental expansion of
the network from the location of the event, using, e.g., the Incre-
mental Network Expansion algorithm (INE) [7]. This algorithm
retrieves the nearest neighbors from a starting point incrementally
and ordered by distance to the point. We assume that the function
retrieve_Next_NN _INE gets the next nearest neighbor that the
INE algorithm would return.
In addition to the set of subjects, the PDP builds another set that
corresponds to a back-up plan. This set consists of the subjects that
will be deployed if any of the subjects in the primary plan fail to
reach the emergency location. For example, a subject may not reply
to the notification withing a reasonable time limit, or it may get
delayed due to traffic. If this is the case, the system can quickly use
the back-up plan to choose another subject without re-evaluating
the entire request.
The pseudocode for the complete algorithm is shown in Figure 3.
The algorithm performs as follows. First, given the category of the
event, the type and number of required entities is retrieved for both
the primary and the backup plan (steps 2 and 3). These values are
stored in pairs [ti, ni], where ti is a type and and ni is the number of
subjects of that type that are still required (i.e., this value will be at
its maximum at the beginning of the execution, and it will decrease
when subjects are found). The value k represents the maximum
number of subject types in the system.
Then, INE is initialized (step 4). The algorithm executes while
not all the subjects have been found (represented by the condition in
step 5). For the next nearest neighbor that is found (step 6), the type
is extracted (step 7). If there is a subject of that type required for
either the primary plan (lines 8–10) or the back-up plan (lines 11–
13), the subject is added to the corresponding set. The algorithm
terminates when all the required subjects are found.
FindSubjects
Input: event location l and category c
Output: set of subjects for the primary plan Sp,
set of subjects for the back-up plan Sb
1. Sp, Sb = ∅
2. p = {[t1, n1]...[tk, nk]} = entitiesPrimaryP lan(c)
/* ti = subject type, ni = number of subjects */
3. b = {[t′1, n′1]...[t′k, n′k]} = entitiesBackupP lan(c)
4. initializeINE(l)
5. while ∃ni > 0 ∈ p ∨ ∃n′i > 0 ∈ b
/* while more subjects are needed */
6. s = retrieve_Next_NN _INE() /* uses INE algorithm */
7. t = typeOf(s)
8. if p[t].n > 0 then
/* if the plan needs a subject of that type, add it */
9. Sp = Sp ∪ {s}
10. p[t].n← p[t].n− 1
11. else if b[t].n > 0 then
/* if the backup needs a subject of that type, add it */
12. Sb = Sb ∪ {s}
13. b[t].n← b[t].n− 1
Figure 3: Find Nearby Subjects
Recall that the distance used in retrieve_Next_NN _INE is mea-
sured as the expected time to travel from the current position to the
location of the accident. Thus, the distance considered is the travel
time distance instead of road network distance.
If the event has a maxResponseT ime, the algorithm is mod-
ified to maintain a queue containing the discarded subjects (af-
ter line 13). In addition, the loop terminates when the distance
(travel time) from the last nearest neighbor found is bigger than
maxResponseT ime. If no results are found when the expansion
reaches maxResponseT ime or if the results are not enough, the
entities belonging to the discarded queue are considered. We can
assume that in these cases, the confidentiality can be relaxed in or-
der to provide a fast response time. For example, a volunteer may
be sent to the emergency instead of a doctor. Moreover, the system
could create some range constraints that trigger an alert when some
of the required subjects are in the vicinity.
We have illustrated a simplified version of the algorithm in which
the roles are not interchangeable. That is, the algorithm would look
for a volunteer even if there is a doctor nearby that can perform the
same (and more) operations. If roles can be ordered or organized in
a hierarchical manner, the algorithm should be modified to identify
the subjects in a more efficient manner.
3.3 Constraint and Policy Processing
After the subjects that belong to the primary and the back-up plan
are found, the PDP queries the PolicyDB to retrieve the policies
affecting the subjects in both plans. As mentioned in Section 2.2,
some of these policies will need to be instantiated for the specific
objects of the event. From the set of retrieved policies, the spatio-
temporal constraints are extracted and sent to the PEP, which will
start the monitoring process.
We identify two kinds of location constraints:
• nearest neighbor constraints (e.g., “Volunteer A is a 2-nearest
neighbor of the accident site”)
• proximity (range) constraints (e.g., “Volunteer A is within 5-
minutes of the accident site”)
Note that as the final decision regarding an access request is done
by the PDP, both the PEP and the PDP need to maintain the list of
active constraints with their state (however, recall that the active
monitoring of the constraints is performed only by the PEP). For
example, the policy, “A volunteer is not allowed to access a pa-
tient’s symptoms if there is a doctor nearby,” will initially allow
the volunteer to access the information, but will revoke the access
when a doctor arrives. Similarly, the monitoring of the constraint
of the policy, “A volunteer is allowed to access a patient’s symp-
toms when the arrival time to the patient is less than 1 minute,”
will allow the system to send a notification to the subject when s/he
is close enough, without the subject requesting it. In other cases,
for example if the system detects that a subject is delayed due to
a traffic jam, the PDP may choose to send another subject to the
emergency.
The PEP monitors the spatio-temporal constraints and notifies
the PDP when a constraint changes state (from being met to not
being met or vice versa). The factors that may change the state of
a constraint, and thus need to be monitored, are the following:
1. movement of the subjects and/or the constraints
2. changes in the environmental conditions (e.g., traffic jams,
represented as changes to the edge weights)
3. time expiration of the constraint
4. requirements of the event (e.g., change of the category of the
event)
5. a subject becomes unavailable (subject changes status from
available to not available)
The location constraints at the PEP can be monitored as de-
scribed in the literature [6]. In this work, the authors propose two
methods to monitor kNN’s in road networks, the first of which
maintains the query results by processing only updates that may
invalidate the current NN sets, and the second of which follows
the shared execution paradigm to reduce processing time. More-
over, the methods support object and query movement patterns and
modifications of edge weights (thus supporting factors 1 and 2).
Although the structures presented in this work can be applied in
range queries and RkNN queries, solutions to efficiently support
this functionality still need to be developed.
To monitor the time expiration (factor 3), the PEP can maintain
a queue ordered by expiration time. When a constraint reaches
its expiration time, it is removed from the system, and the PDP is
notified.
For the last two factors (factors 4 and 5), the PEP can main-
tain two indices, based on the events (factor 4) and the subjects
(factor 5). When these entities change status, all the constraints in
which they are involved are eliminated from the system (and the
PDP is notified as in the previous cases).
The PDP maintains a list of the active policies and constraints
and the current state. This list is queried when a subject requests ac-
cess to an object of the system. When a constraint changes its state,
the factor that originated this change is examined. If the reason was
a change of the event requirements (factor 4), the entire plan for the
event needs to be re-evaluated. For the remaining cases, the system
may make use of the back-up plan.
4. FUTURE WORK
In this position paper, we have identified several challenging re-
search issues in location-based access control for helthcare emer-
gency response. In the future, we plan to formalize the proposed
event and policy models and to develop and prototype the func-
tionality that must be implemented in the PEP and PDP. We also
envision extending our proposal to take into account uncertainty in
reporting location data, as well as the privacy issues that arise when
subjects are required to report their location to the PEP.
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